Transition matrix models of consumer credit ratings by Malik, Madhur & Thomas, Lyn C.
 1 
Transition Matrix Models of Consumer Credit Ratings 
  
Abstract 
        Although the corporate credit risk literature has many studies modelling the change 
in the credit risk of corporate bonds over time, there is far less analysis of the credit risk 
for portfolios of consumer loans. However behavioural scores, which are commonly 
calculated on a monthly basis by most consumer lenders are the analogues of ratings in 
corporate credit risk. Motivated by studies in corporate credit risk, we develop a Markov 
chain model based on behavioural scores to establish the credit risk of portfolios of 
consumer loans. Although such models have been used by lenders to develop models for 
the Basel Accord, there is no published literature on them. The model we suggest differs 
in many respects from the corporate credit ones based on Markov chains – such as the 
need for a second order Markov chain, the inclusion of economic variables and the age of 
the loan. The model is applied using data on a credit card portfolio from a major UK bank. 
JEL classification: C25; G21; G33 
Keywords: Markov chain; Credit risk; Logistic regression; Credit scoring 
1. Introduction 
Since the mid 1980s, banks’ lending to consumers has exceeded that to companies 
( Crouhy et al 2001). However it was only with the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 and 
the subsequent credit crunch that it was realised what an impact such lending had on the 
banking sector and also how under researched it is compared with corporate lending 
models. In particular the need for robust models of the credit risk of portfolios of 
consumer loans has been  brought into sharp focus by the failure of the ratings agencies 
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to accurately assess the credit risks of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) which are based on such portfolios. There are many 
reasons put forward for the subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent credit crunch 
( Hull 2009, Demyanyk and van Hemert 2008) but clearly one reason that the former led 
to the latter was the lack of an easily updatable model of the credit risk of portfolios of 
consumer loans. This lack of a suitable model of portfolio level consumer risk was first 
highlighted during the development of the Basel Accord, when a corporate credit risk 
model was used to calculate the regulatory capital for all types of loans ( Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2005) even though the basic idea of such a model – 
that default occurs when debts exceed assets – is not the reason why consumers default. 
This paper develops a model for the credit risk of portfolios of consumer loans based on 
behavioural scores for the individual consumers, whose loans make up that portfolio. 
Such a model is attractive to lenders, since almost all lenders calculate behavioural scores 
for all their borrowers on a monthly basis. The behavioural score is usually translated into 
the default probability over a fixed time horizon ( usually one year) in the future for that 
borrower, but one can consider it as a surrogate for the unobservable creditworthiness of 
the borrower. We build a Markov chain credit risk model based on behavioural scores for 
consumers which has similarities with the reduced form mark to market corporate credit 
risk models based on the rating agencies‘ grades, ( Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull 1997). 
Such behavioural score based Markov chain models have been developed by lenders for 
their Basel modelling but no analysis has appeared in the literature and in this paper we 
discuss what features should be included in such models and compare a standard and a 
more sophisticated version of the model. The methodology constructs an empirical 
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forecasting model to derive a multi-period distribution of the default rate for long time 
horizons based on migration matrices built from a historical database of behavioural 
scores. Although it is possible to calibrate score to long run probability of default if one 
has data over a sufficiently long outcome period that data is not available in practice. The 
transition matrix approach allows one to undertake such calibration using much shorter 
data series. In our case study we use the lenders’ behavioural scores but we can use the 
same methodology on generic bureau scores.  
The approach also helps lenders take long term lending decisions by estimating the risk 
associated with the change in the quality of portfolio of loans over time. Since the model 
includes economic conditions, the approach allows banks to stress test their retail 
portfolios as required by the Basel Accord and other banking regulations. In addition, the 
model provides insights on portfolio profitability, the determination of appropriate capital 
reserves, and creating estimates of portfolio value by generating portfolio level credit loss 
distributions. 
There have been some recent papers which look at modelling the credit risk in consumer 
loan portfolios. Rosch and Scheule (2004) take a variant of the one factor Credit Metrics 
model, which is the basis of the Basel Accord. They use empirical correlations between 
different consumer loan types and try to build in economic variables to explain the 
differences during different parts of the business cycle. Perli and Nayda (2004) also take 
the corporate credit risk structural models and seek to apply it to consumer lending 
assuming that a consumer defaults if his assets are lower than a specified threshold. 
However consumer defaults are usually  more about cash flow problems, financial 
naiveté or fraud  and so such a model misses some of the aspects of consumer defaults. 
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Musto and Souleles (2005) use equity pricing as an analogy for changes in the value of 
consumer loan portfolios. They use behavioural scores but take the monthly differences 
in behavioural scores as the return on assets when applying their equity model.  
Andrade and Thomas ( 2007) describe a structural model for the credit risk of consumer 
loans where the behavioural score is a surrogate for the creditworthiness of the borrower. 
A default occurs if the value of this reputation for creditworthiness, in terms of access to 
further credit drops below the cost of servicing the debt. Using a case study based on 
Brazilian credit bureau they found that a random walk was the best model for the 
idiosyncratic part of creditworthiness. Malik and Thomas (2010) developed a hazard 
model of time to default for consumer loans where the risk factors were the behavioural 
score, the age of the loan and economic variables, and used it to develop a credit risk 
model for portfolios of consumer loans. Bellotti and Crook ( 2009) also used proportional 
hazards to develop a default risk model for consumer loans. They investigated which 
economic variables, might be the most appropriate though they did not use behavioural 
scores in their model. Thomas (2009b) reviewed the consumer credit risk models and 
pointed out the analogies with some of the established corporate credit risk models.  
Since the seminal paper by Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull ( Jarrow et al 1997), the Markov 
chain approach has proved popular in modelling the dynamics of the credit risk in 
corporate portfolios. The idea is to describe the dynamics of the risk in terms of the 
transition probabilities between the different grades the rating agencies’ award to the 
firm’s bonds. There are papers which look at how economic conditions as well as the 
industry sector of the firm affects the transitions matrices, ( Nickell et al 2001) while 
others generalise the original Jarrow, Lando Turnbull idea by using Affine Markov chains 
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(Hurd and Kuznetsov 2006) or continuous time processes ( Lando and Skodeberg 2002). 
However none of these suggest increasing the order of the Markov chain or considering 
the age of the loan which are two of the features which we introduce in order to model 
consumer credit risk using  Markov chains. This is surprising because there is work on 
downgrading by rating agencies, which suggests there is a momentum effect in which 
when a company has been downgraded it is more likely to be further downgraded than to 
be subsequently upgraded ( Bangia et al 2002). 
Markov chain models have been used in the consumer lending context before, but none of 
the published papers use the behavioural score as the state space nor is the objective of 
the models to estimate the credit risk at the portfolio level. The first application was by 
Cyert (1962) who developed a Markov chain model of customer’s repayment behaviour. 
Subsequently more complex models have been developed by Ho (2001), Thomas et al 
(2001) and Trench et al (2003). Schneiderjans and Lock (1994) used Markov chain 
models to model the marketing aspects of customer relationship management in the 
banking environment. 
Behavioural score based Markov chain models are sometimes used in the industry, see 
Scallan (1998) but mainly as ways of assessing provisioning estimates and they do not 
include the economic drivers and months on books effects presented in this paper. 
Moreover the introduction of economic factors into the model allows one to deal with the 
correlations between defaults on individual loans in a portfolio since they are affected by 
common economics. One can get the mean default rate in a portfolio from the long run 
distributions while a Monte Carlo simulation using the transitions of individual loans 
would give the distribution of the default rate.  
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In section two, we review the properties of behavioural scores and Markov chains, while 
in section three we describe the Markov chain behavioural score based consumer credit 
risk model developed. This is parameterised by using cumulative logistic regression to 
estimate the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. The motivation behind the 
model and the accuracy of the model’s forecasts are given by means of a case study and 
section four describes the details of the data used in the case study. Sections five, six and 
seven give the reasons why one includes in the model higher order transition matrices 
(section five); economic variables to explain the non stationarity of the chain (section six) 
and the age of the loan (section seven). Section eight describes the full model used, while 
section nine reports the results of out of sample and out of time and out of sample 
forecasts using the model. The final section draws some conclusions including how the 
model could be used. It also identifies one issue – which economic variables drive 
consumer credit risk – where further investigation would benefit all models of consumer 
credit risk. 
 
2. Behaviour Score Dynamics and Markov Chain models  
Consumer lenders use behavioural scores updated every month to assess the credit risk of 
individual borrowers. The score is considered to be a sufficient statistic of the probability 
a borrower will be “Bad” and so default within a certain time horizon (normally taken to 
be the next twelve months). Borrowers who are not Bad are classified as “Good”. So at 
time t, a typical borrower with characteristics x(t) ( which may describe recent repayment 
and usage performance, the current information available at a credit bureau on the 
borrower, and socio-demographic details) has a score s(x(t),t) so 
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Some lenders obtain a Probability of Default (PD), required under the Basel Accord by 
taking a combination of behavioural and application scores.  New borrowers are scored 
using only the application score to estimate PD: once there is sufficient history for a 
behavioural score to be calculated, then a weighted combination of the two scores is used 
to calculate PD; eventually the loan is sufficiently mature that only the behavioural score 
is used to calculate PD. The models described hereafter can also be applied to such a 
combined scoring system. 
Most scores are log odds score (Thomas 2009a) so the direct relationship between the 
score and the probability of being Bad is given by 
( ( ), )
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  (2) 
though in reality this may not hold exactly. Applying Bayes theorem to (2) gives the 
expansion where if pG(t) is the proportion of the population who are Good at time t (pB(t) 
is the proportion who are Bad) one has 
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 (3) 
The first term is the log of the population odds at time t and the second term is the weight 
of evidence for that score, (Thomas 2009a). This decomposition may not hold exactly in 
practice and is likely to change as a scorecard ages However it shows that the term spop(t), 
common to the scores of all borrowers, can be thought to play the role of a systemic 
factor which affects the default risk of all the borrowers in a portfolio. Normally though 
the time dependence of a behavioural score is ignored by lenders. Lenders are usually 
only interested in ranking borrowers in terms of risk and they believe that the second term 
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( the weight of evidence ) in (3), which is the only one that affects the ranking, is more 
stable over time than spop(t) particularly over horizons of  two or three years. However the 
time dependence is important because it describes the dynamics of the credit risk of the 
borrower. Given the strong analogies between behavioural scores in consumer credit and 
the credit ratings used for corporate credit risk, one obvious way of describing the 
dynamics of behavioural scores is to use a Markov chain approach similar to the reduced 
form mark to market models of corporate credit risk (Jarrow et al 1997). To use a Markov 
chain approach to behavioural scores, we divide the score range into a number of 
intervals  each of which represents a state of the Markov chain, and hereafter when we 
mention behavioural scores we are thinking of this Markov chain version of the score, 
where states are intervals of the original score range. 
Markov chains have proved ubiquitous models of stochastic processes because their 
simplicity belies their power to model a variety of situations. Formally, we define a 
discrete time {t0,t1,...,tn ,...: n ∈N} and a finite state space S = {1,2,...,s} first order 
Markov chain as a stochastic process {X(tn)}n∈N with the property that for any s0, 
s1, …,sn-1, i, j ∈ S 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 4
n n n n
n n ij n n
P X t j | X t s ,X t s ,...,X t s ,X t i
P X t j | X t i p t ,t
+ − −
+ +
= = = = =
= = = =
 
where pij (tn,tn+1) denotes the transition probability of going from state i at time tn to state j 
at time tn+1. The s×s matrix of elements pij (., .), denoted P(tn,tn+1),  is called the first order 
transition probability matrix associated with the stochastic process {X(tn)}n∈N. If 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1n n s nt t ,..., tpi = pi pi  describes the probability distribution of the states of the 
process at time tn, the Markov property implies that the distribution at time tn+1 can be 
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obtained from that at time tu by ( ) ( ) ( )1 1n n n nt t P t ,t+ +pi = pi . This extends to a m-stage 
transition matrix so that the distribution at time tn+m for 2m ≥ is given by  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1n m n n n n m n mt t P t ,t ... P t ,t+ + + − +pi = pi  
The Markov chain is called time homogeneous or stationary provided   
( ) ( )1 5ij n n ijp t ,t p n N .+ = ∀ ∈  
Assume the process {X(tn)}n∈N is a nonstationary Markov chain, which is the case with 
the data we examine later. If one has a sample of histories of previous customers, let ni 
(tn), i∈S, be the number who are in state i at time tn, whereas let nij(tn,tn+1) be the number 
who move from state i at time tn to state j at time tn+1. The maximum likelihood estimator 
of ( )1ij n np t ,t +  is then   
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1 6
ij n n
ij n n
i n
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n t
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+ =  
If one assumed that the Markov chain was stationary, then given the data for T+1 time 
periods n= 0, 1, 2,…, T, the Transition probability estimates become 
( )
( )
( )
1
1
0
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0
5
T
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n
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n
n t ,t
pˆ
n t
−
+
=
−
=
=
∑
∑
 
 Note that the Markov property means that previous transitions do not affect the current 
probabilities of transition and so in these calculations we do not need to be concerned that 
transitions coming from the same customer are dependent. All transitions are essentially 
independent even those from the same customer. One can weaken the Markov property 
so that the information required to estimate the future of the chain is the current state and 
the previous state of the process. This is called a second order Markov chain which is 
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equivalent to the process being a first order Markov chain but with state space S × S. The 
concept can be generalized to defining kth order Markov chains for any k , though of 
course, the state space and the size of the transition probability matrices goes up 
exponentially as k increases.  
 
3. Behavioural score based Markov Chain model of Consumer Credit Risk 
The behavioural score Bt  of a borrower is an observable variable given by a scorecard. It 
is related to the underlying unobservable “credit worthiness”, Ut of the borrower, which 
also depends on the length of time the loan has been running and the current economic 
situation.  Our model is constructed by assuming that the borrower’s behavioural score is 
in one of a finite number of states, namely {s0=D, s1,…sn, C} where si  i>0 describes an 
interval in the behavioural score range; s0 =D means the borrower has defaulted and C is 
the state when the borrower closed his loan or credit card account having repaid 
everything ( an absorbing state). The Markov property means that the dynamics from 
time t onwards of the behavioural score is conditional on the realization of the score state 
at time t-1, Bt-1  or at least that its movement between the score range intervals depends 
only on which current interval it is in.
 
Given the behavioural score is in state si , i=1,….n, 
at time t-1, we write the latent variable Ut at time t  as itU .  For the active accounts, 
i
tU  is 
defined so that the relationship between Bt and itU  is that 
1 0 1,    j 0,1,..  with ,i i it j j t j nB s U nµ µ µ µ+ += ⇔ ≤ ≤ = = −∞ = ∞   (6) 
where ijµ  are the values in the unobservable credit worthiness which correspond to the 
end points of the behavioural score intervals si . Moreover one chooses 1
iµ so that if the 
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consumer defaults one must have 1
i i
tU µ≤ . The dynamics of the underlying variable itU  is 
assumed to be related to the explanatory variable vector xt-1 by a linear regression of the 
form 1
i ' i
t i t tU x −= − β + ε , where βi is a column vector of regression coefficients and εit are 
random error terms. If the itε  are standard logistic distributions, then this is a cumulative 
logistic regression model and the transition probabilities of Bt are given by 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1 2 1 11 1
1
Prob B  D|B =s logit  ,
Prob B  s |B =s logit logit  ,                           7
                                                
Prob B  s |B =s 1 logit
i '
t t i i t
i ' i '
t t i i t i t
i
t n t i n
x
x x
− −
− − −
−
= = µ + β
= = µ + β − µ + β
= = − µ +
  
( )1'i tx .−β
 
Estimating cumulative logistic model using usual maximum likelihood means that 
conditional on the realization the time dependent covariate vector xt-1, transitions to 
various states for different borrowers in the next time period are independent both cross-
sectionally and through time. So the dynamics of the behavioural scores is driven by the 
explanatory variable xt-1 . In the model presented we assume three types of drivers – 
economic variables, the age of the loan and the previous behaviour of the score. We 
justify these choices in sections 5 to 7 by looking at their effect on the simple first order 
Markov chain model. Note that states C and D are absorbing states and so there are no 
transitions from them and we will discuss the modeling of movements to the closed state, 
C,  in section 8  
This has parallels with some of the corporate credit risk models. In Credit Metrics for 
example (Gordy 2000) the transition in corporate ratings are given by changes in the 
underlying “asset” variables in a similar fashion but with quite different drivers.  
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Since behaviour scores are only calculated monthly, calendar time t needs to be discrete  
and then the creditworthiness at time t of a borrower, whose credit worthiness at time t-1 
was in state i ,is given by the latent variable Uit, which satisfies the relationship  
( )1
2
8
K
i i
t ik t k i t t
k
U a State . c MoB
− −
=
= − − − + ε∑ i t-1b EcoVar  
where Statet-k is a vector of  indicator variables denoting borrower’s state at time t-k, 
EcoVart-1 is a vector of economic variables at time t-1, MoBt-1  is a vector of  indicator 
variables denoting the length of time the loan has been on the books in months ( Months 
on Books) at time t-1 . One could smooth this latter effect by using a continuous variable 
of the age of the loan but we describe the effect using more predictive binary variables 
for different age bands . a, b, and c are coefficients in the expression and itε  is a random 
variable representing a logit error term. Since Uit depends on i, the underlying 
creditworthiness at time t depends on the state at t-1 and so the behavioural score at time t 
will also depend on the state, and hence the behavioural score, at time t-1. If 0ika ≠ then 
the credit worthiness at time t also depends on the state at time t-k and so the Markov 
chain model of the corresponding behavioural scores Bt will be of order k. The transitions 
also depend on economic variables and on the length of time the loan has been repaid. 
Since the coefficients depend on i  then the impact of these other factors will vary from 
state to state. If the score band intervals were of  equal length and the decomposition in (3) 
really held then one would expect 0, 0,ik ia c= = =ib b and so this model allows for more 
complex dynamics in the behavioural scores. 
The Months on books term does not occur in any corporate credit models, but is of real 
importance in consumer lending ( Breeden 2007, Stepanova and Thomas 2002). Similarly 
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it is rare to have higher order Markov chains models in corporate credit , though the state 
space is sometimes extended to include whether there have been recent upgrades or 
downgrades in the ratings. Thus although corporate credit models may have more 
complex factors affecting their dynamics such as industry type, geographical area and 
seniority of the debt, they are not so much affected by recent changes of state or the age 
of the loan which are important in consumer credit risk models.  
 
4. Data Description 
The dataset used for the case study in this paper contains records of credit card customers 
of a major UK bank who were on the books as of January 2001 together with all those 
who joined between January 2001 and December 2005. The data set consists of 
customers' monthly behavioural scores along with the information on their time since 
account opened, time to default or time when the account was closed within the above 
duration. We randomly selected approximately 50,000 borrowers for a training data set 
which contained their history over the period Jan 2001 – Dec 2004. We tested our 
Markov models using customer’s performance during 2005 from a subsample of the 
50,000 and also from a holdout sample of approximately 15,000 customers. Anyone, who 
became 90 days delinquent (even if they subsequently were cured), was charged off or 
declared bankrupt, is considered as having defaulted.  
 
The bank reported that there were no major changes in credit limit setting or minimum 
repayment levels during the period under consideration, nor were there any changes in 
the scorecard or intentional attempts to change the mix of the portfolio of borrowers 
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through portfolio acquisition or marketing campaigns. To analyse the changes in the 
distribution of behavioural score we first coarse classify behavioural score into various 
segments. Initially, we segment the behavioural score into deciles of the distribution of 
the score among all the borrowers in the sample over all the months in the sample. We 
use the chi-square statistic to decide whether to combine adjacent deciles if their 
transition probabilities are sufficiently similar. This technique of coarse classifying is 
standard in scorecard building (Thomas 2009a) to deal with continuous variables where 
the relationship with default is non linear. In this case it led to a reduction to five 
scorebands, namely s1={113-680}, s2={681-700}, s3={701-715}, s4={716-725} and 
s5={726 and above}. As well as these five states there are two more special states 
corresponding to Default and Account Closed.  If there are too many states in the chain 
the parameter estimates lose robustness, while if there are too few one loses structure and 
one does not have enough segments to validate the model according to the Basel Accord 
requirements.  
Behavioural scores are generated or updated every month for each individual so it would 
be possible to estimate a 1-month time step transition matrix. Since transitions between 
some states will have very few 1 month transitions, such a model may lead to less than 
robust estimates of the parameters. Hence we use 3-month time steps. Longer time steps, 
say six or twelve months, make it harder to include the impact of the changes in 
economics and the months on books effect. In the following sections we shall justify the 
use of higher order Markov chains and provide an analysis of the effects of time varying 
macroeconomic and months on books covariates on behavioural score transitions.  
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5. Order of the Transition Matrix 
We first estimate the average transition matrix, assuming the Markov chain is stationary 
and first order using the whole duration of the sample from January 2001 to December 
2004. Table 1 shows the 3-month time step transition matrix for that sample, where the 
figures in brackets are the standard sampling errors. As one might expect, once a 
borrower is in the least risky state ( s5 ) there is a high probability, 88%, they will stay 
there in the next quarter. More surprisingly the state with the next highest probability of 
the borrower staying there is s1, the riskiest behavioural score state, while borrowers in 
the other states move around more. The probabilities of defaulting in the next quarter are 
monotone with, as one would  expect, 13-680 being the most risky state with a default 
probability of 6.7% and 726-high the least risky state with a default probability of 0.2%. 
Note that there is the obvious stochastic dominance ( 1ij i j
j k j k
p p +
≥ ≥
≤∑ ∑ ) for all the active 
states, which shows that the behavioural score correctly reflects future score changes as 
well as future defaults.  
Table 1: First Order Average Transition Matrix 
Initial State Transition State
13-680 681-700 701-715 716-725 726-high Closed Default
13-680 49.0 22.1 9.6 4.0 4.0 4.7 6.7
(0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
681-700 15.7 34.7 25.1 9.6 11.2 2.8 0.8
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
701-715 6.0 13.6 35.9 18.1 23.4 2.6 0.5
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
716-725 3.0 6.1 15.7 28.3 44.1 2.5 0.3
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0)
726-high 0.7 1.2 2.7 4.3 88.4 2.4 0.2
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
 
This first order Markov chain model assumes that the current state has all the information 
needed to estimate the probability of the transitions next quarter and so these are 
unaffected by the borrower’s previous states.  If this is not true, one should use a second 
or higher order Markov chain model. This might seem surprising in that a behavioural 
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score is considered to be a sufficient statistic of the credit risk. However this is a very 
specific credit risk – the chance of default in the next 12 months whereas the Markov 
chain describes the dynamics of the credit risk estimates over a different 12 month 
interval each period. Thus it is quite possible the score does not include all the 
information needed to estimate how this risk is likely to change. Table 2 displays the 
estimates of the transition matrix for such a second order chain, obtained in a similar way 
as Table 1. Analysing Table 2 shows that there are substantial changes in the transition 
probabilities based on the previous state of the borrower. Consider for example if the 
current state is the risky one s1= {13-680}. If borrowers were also in the risky state last 
quarter then the chance of staying on it or defaulting in the next quarter is 58% 
+7%=65%.; if they were in the least risky state in the last quarter { 726+} but are now in 
s1 , the chance of being in s1 or default next quarter is 22.8%+7.7%=30.5%.   
Table 2: Second Order Average Transition Matrix 
(Previous State, Current State)
13-680 681-700 701-715 716-725 726-high Closed Default
(13-680,13-680) 58.0 19.2 6.9 2.3 1.6 5.0 7.0
(681-700,13-680) 42.2 27.8 12.2 4.2 3.2 3.8 6.6
(701-715,13-680) 36.7 28.3 13.0 6.5 5.2 4.2 6.1
(716-725,13-680) 34.7 23.8 15.4 8.4 7.0 3.8 6.9
(726-high,13-680) 22.8 18.9 16.0 9.5 19.9 5.2 7.7
(13-680,681-700) 24.5 36.7 21.3 7.0 6.6 3.1 0.8
(681-700,681-700) 14.0 40.4 25.7 8.2 7.9 3.1 0.7
(701-715,681-700) 12.4 34.4 29.4 10.1 10.3 2.7 0.7
(716-725,681-700) 13.8 27.7 26.8 12.9 15.5 2.5 0.8
(726-high,681-700) 9.3 20.9 23.0 15.0 28.5 2.4 1.0
(13-680,701-715) 14.2 19.0 28.2 17.6 17.0 3.6 0.5
(681-700,701-715) 7.6 19.8 36.6 15.8 17.1 2.5 0.6
(701-715,701-715) 4.7 12.2 45.7 17.7 16.7 2.6 0.4
(716-725,701-715) 4.2 11.0 36.6 22.5 22.6 2.6 0.5
(726-high,701-715) 4.3 8.9 24.1 18.3 41.3 2.6 0.6
(13-680,716-725) 9.9 11.8 16.7 20.9 37.1 3.2 0.6
(681-700,716-725) 4.9 11.3 19.8 22.6 37.7 3.4 0.2
(701-715,716-725) 3.0 7.5 21.6 28.9 36.0 2.7 0.3
(716-725,716-725) 2.4 4.5 15.5 42.1 32.9 2.4 0.3
(726-high,716-725) 1.8 4.1 12.3 23.6 55.4 2.5 0.3
(13-680,726-high) 5.5 5.6 7.9 8.5 69.3 3.1 0.2
(681-700,726-high) 3.1 6.4 10.2 12.1 64.7 3.2 0.3
(701-715,726-high) 2.1 4.1 9.6 12.2 68.8 2.9 0.3
(716-725,726-high) 1.5 3.0 6.6 12.1 73.8 2.8 0.2
(726-high,726-high) 0.5 0.8 2.0 3.4 90.7 2.4 0.2
Terminal State
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So there is a propensity to reverse direction and return in the direction one came. This 
effect is seen in all the five behavioural score interval states in the model. These results 
do not support the “momentum” idea that borrowers whose score has dropped are more 
likely to drop further (see Bangia et al 2002 for examples in corporate credit), but 
suggests there may be some event of very short duration which appears and then is 
reversed in the next quarter, such as being put in arrears due to some misunderstanding. 
This effect seen in all five states could be due to using score bands rather than the scores 
themselves and so the previous score band might suggest where in the interval the score 
is. However the same result was seen when a finer classification, i.e. more states with 
smaller intervals, was used. One could investigate whether higher order models are even 
more appropriate but for third and higher order Markov chains data sparsity and 
robustness of predictions become problems and so we use a second order chain to model 
the dynamics of the behavioural scores.  
 
6. Macro Economic Variables 
Traditionally behavioural score models are built on customers performance with the bank 
over the previous twelve months using characteristics like average account balance, 
number of times in arrears and current credit bureau information. So the behavioural 
score can be considered as capturing the borrower’s specific risk. However, in corporate 
credit risk models (Das et al, 2007), it was shown that though borrower specific risk is a 
major factor, during economic slowdowns systemic risk factors emerge and have had a 
substantial effect on the default risk in a portfolio of loans. The decomposition of the 
behavioural score in (3) suggests this is also the case in consumer lending, since the 
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population log odds spop(t)  must be affected by such  systemic changes in the economic 
environment. The question is which economic variables affect the default risk of 
consumers. We investigate five variables which have been suggested as important in 
consumer finance ( Tang et al 2007, Liu and Xu 2003), together with one variable that 
reflects market conditions in consumer lending. The variables considered are: 
(a) Percentage Change in Consumer Price Index over 12 Months: reflects the inflation felt 
by customers and high levels may cause rise in customer default rate. 
(b) Monthly average Sterling Inter-bank lending rate: higher values correspond to general 
tightness in the economy as well as increases in  debt service payments. 
(c) Annual Return on FTSE 100: gives the yield from stock market and reflects the 
buoyancy of industry. 
(d) Percentage change in GDP compared with equivalent Quarter in Previous Year:  
(e) UK Unemployment Rate. 
(f) Percentage Change in Net Lending over 12 Months: this gives an indication of the 
funds being made available for consumer lending. 
  
There is a general perception (Figlewski et al, 2007) that change in economic conditions 
do not have an instantaneous effect on default rate. To allow for this, we use lagged 
values of the macroeconomic covariates in the form of weighted average over a six 
months period with an exponentially declining weight of 0.88. This choice is motivated 
by the recent study made by (Figlewski et al, 2007).  Since macro economic variables 
represent the general health of the economy they are expected to show some degree of 
correlation. Table 3 below shows the pairwise correlation matrix for the above six 
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macroeconomic variables with no lags considered. The entries in bold are the correlations 
considered statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus at a 5% significance level 
interest rate is negatively correlated with percentage change in CPI and positively 
correlated with percentage change in GDP and return on the FTSE 100. Similarly, 
percentage change in Net Lending is negatively correlated with Unemployment rate and 
positively correlated with percentage change in GDP and return on the FTSE 100 at 5% 
significance level. The presence of non zero correlation between variables does not 
invalidate the model, but the degree of association between the explanatory variables can 
affect parameter estimation. Moreover the variables used are chosen in so as to avoid 
long run trends and the fact that three of the variables are percentage changes is akin to 
already taking differences to avoid non stationarity    
Table 3: Correlation matrix of macroeconomic factors 
 
Interest 
Rate 
% change in 
CPI 
% change in 
GDP 
% change in 
net lending 
unemployment 
rate 
Return on 
FTSE 100 
Interest Rate 1 -0.51 0.34 0.14 0.01 0.39 
% change in CPI 
-0.51 1 -0.11 -0.23 -0.45 -0.09 
% change in GDP 0.34 -0.11 1 0.85` -0.71 0.87 
% change in net lending 0.14 -0.23 0.85 1 -0.49 0.70 
unemployment rate 0.01 -0.45 -0.71 -0.49 1 -0.73 
Return on FTSE 100 0.39 -0.09 0.87 0.70 -0.73 1 
 
Figure 1 shows the variation of the observed log(Default Odds) over 3 month windows 
compared with the lagged  macroeconomic factor values used in the analysis  for the 
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sample duration of January 2001 to December 2004. The macroeconomic factors values 
are represented by the primary y-axis and the log(Default Odds) by the secondary y-axis.  
Figure 1:3-Month Observed log(Odds Default) and Macroeconomic variables 
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We plot the lagged economic values for each month though of course we only use the 
values every quarter in the Markov chain model since its time period is quarterly. In the 
benign environment of 2001-4 there are no large swings in any variable and the log of the 
default odds - -spop(t) – is quite stable.  
To convince ourselves that changes in economic conditions do affect the transitions 
matrix, we look at transition matrices based on data from two different time periods, 
which have slightly different economic conditions. In order not to complicate matters we 
show the differences that occur even in the first order Markov chain. In Table 4, we 
estimate the first order transition probability matrices for two different twelve months 
calendar time periods between Jan 2001 to December 2004 to judge the effect of calendar 
time on transition probabilities. The first matrix is based on sample of customers who 
were on books during Jan-Dec 2001 and uses their transitions each quarter during that 
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period and the second is based on those in the portfolio during Sept03 – Oct04 and their 
performance during that period. Both transition matrices show considerable similarities 
with the whole sample average transition matrix in Table 1, with the probability of 
moving into default decreasing as the behavioural score increases and the stochastic 
dominance effect still holding. However there are some significant differences between 
the transition probabilities of the two matrices in Table 4. For example, borrowers who 
were in current state of s1={13-680} during Jan-Dec 2001 have a lower probability of 
defaulting in the next quarter -5.5% - than those who were in the same state  
Table 4: Comparison of transition matrices at different calendar times 
Initial state Terminal State 
 13-680 681-700 701-715 716-725 726- Closed Default number in state 
Jan-Dec 2001 
13-680 52.90 21.77 9.24 3.62 3.67 3.31 5.50 24015 
681-700 17.80 35.56 23.86 9.51 10.40 2.14 0.72 25235 
701-715 8.74 14.84 35.25 17.90 22.72 2.16 0.40 31477 
716-725 3.28 6.99 16.84 27.85 42.64 2.12 0.29 27781 
726- 0.72 1.35 2.86 4.30 88.39 2.10 0.28 220981 
Oct 03-Sept 04 
13-680 46.24 22.68 9.30 4.03 4.18 5.35 8.22 24060 
681-700 14.79 35.62 23.25 9.80 10.99 2.74 0.82 25235 
701-715 5.42 13.42 37.30 18.20 22.89 2.33 0.43 42200 
716-725 2.68 5.63 16.17 29.34 43.79 2.05 0.33 38932 
726- 0.62 1.14 2.65 4.69 88.80 1.90 0.19 289814 
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during Sept03 – Oct04 where the value is 8.22%. We test the difference between the 
corresponding transition probabilities in the two matrices in Table 4 using the two-
proportion z-test with unequal variances. The entries in bold in Table 4 identify those 
transition probabilities where the differences between the corresponding terms in the two 
matrices are significant at the 5% level. Note that there are 35 transition probabilities 
being compares and so one might expect 2 significant comparions at the 5% level if there 
were really no difference. There are 20 significant differences which suggest this calendar 
effect is real. 
 
7. Months on Books Effects 
As is well known in consumer credit modeling (Breeden 2007, Stepanova and Thomas 
2002), the age of the loan (the number of months since the account was opened) is an 
important factor in default risk. To investigate this we split age into seven segments 
namely, 0-6 months , 7-12 months, 13-18 months , 19-24 months , 25-36 months , 37-48 
months , more than 48 months.. The effect of age on behavioural score transition 
probabilities can be seen in  Table 5, which shows the first order probability transition 
matrices for borrowers who were on books between one to twelve months ( upper table) 
and more than 48 months ( lower table). Again the overall structure is similar to Table 1, 
but there are significant differences between the transition probabilities of the two 
matrices. Borrowers who are new on the books are more at risk of defaulting or of their 
behavioural score dropping than those who were with the bank for more than four years.  
The bold entries again represent transitions where the differences between the new and 
mature accounts are significantly different at the 5% level.4in the Again the final block of 
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Table 5 gives the z statistic and the bold values indicate where in the tables the 
differences in transitions are statistically significant at the 5% level. This occurs in 27 out 
of the 35 transitions calculated 
Table 5: Comparison of transition matrices for loans of different ages 
Initial state Terminal State 
 13-680 681-700 701-715 716-725 726- Closed Default number in state 
1-12 months ( new obligors) 
13-680 51.0 22.3 8.1 3.1 2.0 5.8 7.6 24858 
681-700 18.2 35.6 24.2 9.3 8.7 3.2 0.8 22019 
701-715 8.1 15.9 30.5 17.8 25.6 2.7 0.5 21059 
716-725 4.5 8.2 14.7 21.4 48.6 2.2 0.3 18050 
726- 1.8 3.0 5.7 7.6 79.3 2.3 0.2 59767 
49-high( mature obligors) 
13-680 44.1 23.5 11.3 4.9 7.0 4.0 5.3 28604 
681-700 13.6 32.5 25.6 10.7 14.4 2.5 0.6 39835 
701-715 4.7 11.8 37.2 18.8 24.8 2.5 0.3 66389 
716-725 2.1 5.0 14.9 30.4 44.7 2.6 0.3 67660 
726- 0.4 0.9 2.1 3.7 90.4 2.4 0.2 698782 
 
 
8. Modeling Transition Probabilities 
Behavioural score segments have a natural ordering structure with low behavioural score 
associated with high default risk and vice versa. This is the structure that is exploited 
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when using cumulative (ordered) logistic regression to model borrowers' transitions 
probabilities as suggested in section 3. (McElvey and Zavoina, 1975).  
The cumulative logistic regression model is appropriate for modelling the movement 
between the  behavioural scorebands and the defaulted state. If we wished also to model 
whether the borrowers close their accounts one would need to use a two stage model. In 
the first stage, one would use logistic regression to estimate the probability of the 
borrower closing the account in the next quarter given his current state, P(Close|beh.score 
band). The second stage would be the model presented here of the movement between the 
different scorebands including default conditional on the borrower not closing the 
account. To arrive at the final transition probabilities one would need to multiply the 
probabilities for each transition obtained in this second stage by the chance the account is 
not closed obtained from the first stage, (1-P(Close| beh.score band)). This approach 
assumes the residuals of the estimations in the two stages are independent.   
So we now fit the cumulative logistic model to estimate the transition probabilities of a 
borrower’s movement in behavioural score from being in state i  at time t-1 1t iB s− =  to 
where the borrower will be at time t, tB .  These transitions depend on the current state  
Bt-1 = si ( since they are indexed by i ), the previous state of the borrower, 2tB − , the 
lagged economic variables and the age of the loan ( Months on Books or MoB). So one 
uses the model given by (6) and (8) but restricted to the second order case, namely 
1 0 1
2 1 1
,    j 0,1,..  with ,i i it j j t j n
i i
t i t i t i t t
B s U n
U a State b EcoVar c MoB
µ µ µ µ
ε
+ +
− − −
= ⇔ ≤ ≤ = = −∞ = ∞
= − − − +
   (9) 
In order to choose which economic variables to include , we recall that Table 3 described 
the correlation between the variables. To reduce the effect of such correlations (so that 
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the coefficients of the economic variables are understandable), we considered various 
subsets of the macro economic variables as predictors in a cumulative logistic model, 
where there was little correlation between the variables. In Table 6 we present parameter 
estimates for the cumulative logistic models for each behavioural score segment with 
only two macroeconomic variables, namely interest rate and net lending, along with 
months on books and the previous state. This means we allow the drivers of the dynamics 
– economic variables and current duration of loan- to have different effects on the 
transitions from different states. The model with these two variables- interest rate and net 
lending- provided a better fit in terms of the likelihood ratio of the model than other 
combinations of macroeconomic variables- the next best fit was unemployment and 
interest rates. We employ stepwise selection keeping only variables with a 5% 
significance level for the corresponding regression coefficient to be non-zero. The 
likelihood ratios and the associated p-values show that for each current behavioural score 
segment, transitions to other states in the next time period are significantly influenced by 
current macroeconomic factors, current months on books and information on previous 
state, represented by a Secstate variable in Table 6. This model fits the data better than 
the first order average transition matrix. A positive sign of the coefficient in the model is 
associated with a decrease in creditworthiness and vice versa. So the creditworthiness of 
borrowers decreases in the next time period with an increase in interest rates in all current 
behavioural score segments. 
Borrowers who are between 7 and 18 months on the books have higher default and 
downgrading risks than the others. This confirms the market presumption that new 
borrowers have higher default risk than older borrowers in any give time period, once 
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they have had sufficient time (i.e at least 3 months) to default. The coefficients of the 
Secstate variable, with one exception, decrease monotonically in value from the s1={13-
680} category to the  s5 ={726-high} state. Those with lower behavioural score last 
quarter are more likely to have lower behavioural score next quarter than those with the 
same behavioural score currently but who came from higher behavioural score bands. So 
the idea of credit risk continuing in the same direction is not supported. 
Table 6: Parameters for second order Markov chain with age and economic variables 
Parameter Estimates
Initial Behavioural Score
13-680 Std Error 681-700 Std Error 701-715 Std Error 716-725 Std Error 726-high Std Error
Interest Rate 0.0334 (0.0161) 0.092 (0.0143) 0.0764 (0.0123) 0.0834 (0.0134) 0.0778 (0.00885)
Net Lending 0.0129 (0.00489)
Months on Books
0-6 -0.027 (0.0351) 0.0161 (0.0347) -0.2182 (0.0368) -0.1637 (0.0448) -0.0849 (0.0315)
7-12 0.2019 (0.0241) 0.1247 (0.0225) 0.2051 (0.0226) 0.2317 (0.0261) 0.3482 (0.018)
13-18 0.2626 (0.0262) 0.2663 (0.0236) 0.2301 (0.0228) 0.2703 (0.0268) 0.2554 (0.0193)
19-24 -0.07 (0.0275) -0.0796 (0.0251) -0.1001 (0.0241) -0.0873 (0.0284) 0.031 (0.0206)
25-36 -0.0015 (0.0244) -0.0521 (0.0223) 0.00191 (0.0198) -0.00487 (0.0229) -0.0254 (0.0162)
37-48 -0.0703 (0.0262) -0.0519 (0.0243) 0.019 (0.0206) -0.0801 (0.0241) -0.00709 (0.0166)
49-high -0.2957 -0.2235 -0.13781 -0.16603 -0.51721
SecState
13-680 0.8372 (0.0165) 0.6762 (0.0168) 0.5145 (0.0222) 0.3547 (0.0337) 0.381 (0.0399)
681-700 0.2365 (0.0201) 0.2847 (0.0139) 0.3598 (0.0146) 0.1942 (0.0224) 0.5168 (0.024)
701-715 -0.0111 (0.0249) 0.0491 (0.0168) 0.1314 (0.0119) 0.1255 (0.0164) 0.2991 (0.0178)
716-725 -0.1647 (0.0345) -0.1764 (0.0239) -0.1795 (0.016) 0.0098 (0.0152) 0.0525 (0.0162)
726-high -0.8979 -0.8336 -0.8262 -0.6842 -1.2494
Intercept/Barrier
Default -3.213 (0.0756) -5.4389 (0.0826) -5.8904 (0.1285) -6.011 (0.0967) -5.1834 (0.0506)
13-680 -0.2078 (0.0734) -2.179 (0.0657) -3.2684 (0.1175) -3.6011 (0.0648) -3.8213 (0.0436)
681-700 1.022 (0.0736) -0.3978 (0.0649) -1.9492 (0.1168) -2.461 (0.062) -2.9445 (0.0421)
701-715 1.9941 (0.0746) 0.861 (0.065) -0.1796 (0.1165) -1.2049 (0.0611) -2.06 (0.0415)
716-725 2.7666 (0.0764) 1.6267 (0.0656) 0.7317 0.171 (0.0609) -1.326 (0.0413)
Likelihhod Ratio 3661.078 3379.459 4137.587 2838.765 20400.65
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
 
 
 
9. Forecasting Multi-Period Transition Probabilities 
The model with the parameters given in Table 6 was tested by forecasting the future 
distributions of the scorebands in the portfolio, including those who have defaulted. The 
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forecast uses the Markov assumption and so multiplies the probability transition matrix 
by itself the appropriate number of times to get the forecasts. In the first case we consider 
all non-defaulted borrowers in December 2004 and used the model to predict their 
distribution over the various behavioral score bands and the default state at the end of 
each quarter of 2005, where closures were dealt with as described in section 8. Not to add 
extra uncertainty to the forecast, the 2005 values of the two economic variables were used. 
The results are shown in Table 7. The initial distribution column gives the distribution of 
borrowers into each behavioural score segment in the test sample in December 2004. The 
observed column gives the observed distribution of borrowers at the end of each quarter 
in 2005.  The other two columns gives the expected number of borrowers in each 
segment at the end of each quarter of 2004 as predicted by the second order average 
transition matrix in Table 2 and those predicted by the model in Table 6.   
Table 7: Distribution at the end of each time period on out of time sample test sample (2005) 
13-680 571 520 560 457 498 561 384 475 566 424 457 573 368
681-700 659 659 696 595 635 702 594 612 711 604 592 719 592
701-715 1094 1011 1066 982 969 1065 918 935 1073 1007 908 1081 938
716-725 973 936 1027 952 902 1036 1038 878 1044 971 859 1049 943
726-high 7436 7535 7304 7666 7589 7208 7644 7627 7098 7511 7647 6989 7612
Default 0 72 80 81 140 160 155 206 241 216 270 322 280
Average 
Matrix
Model 
Predicted
Observed
4-Period
Initial 
Distribution
Average 
Matrix
Model 
Predicted
Observed Average 
Matrix
Model 
Predicted
Observed Average 
Matrix
Model 
Predicted
Behavioural Score 
Segments
1-Period 2-Period 3-Period
Observed
 
The second order Markov chain model with economic variables gave predictions, 
particularly for defaults, which were very close to the actual values for the first and 
second quarters, but begin to overestimate the risks thereafter. So by the fourth quarter 
the average second order Markov chain model which just takes the average of the 
transition probabilities is superior. 
The analysis was repeated on an out of time and out of sample portfolio. Again the 
distribution of the portfolio at the start of the period (April 2005) was given and estimates 
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for the next three quarters obtained using the model in Table 6. The results in Table 8 
show that the second order model with economic and months on books effect (Table 6) is 
better at predicting the actual number of defaults than the second order model without 
these effects (Table 3) even though both approaches slightly under predict. The model 
with the extra drivers is better at predicting the numbers in the default and high risk states, 
while the second order one that just averages over all transitions is better at predicting the 
numbers in the low risk categories. In this data set it appears the second order effect is the 
most important followed by the Months on books effect. However this could be due to 
the relative economic stability throughout both the period represented by both the 
development sample and the out of time test sample. 
Table 8 Distribution at the end of each time period on out of time out of sample test sample (2005) 
13-680 1428 949 1040 1199 879 983 1080 769 889 1043
681-700 1278 1054 1117 1096 978 1061 1076 894 996 1001
701-715 1379 1291 1384 1257 1262 1393 1316 1216 1363 1219
716-725 876 1047 1178 812 1051 1228 774 1044 1234 718
726-high 7514 7994 7621 7968 8059 7535 7943 8208 7596 8074
Default 0 139 134 143 245 274 286 344 397 420
Initial 
Distribution
Average 
Matrix
Model 
Predicted
Observed Average 
Matrix
Model 
Predicted
Observed Average 
Matrix
Model 
Predicted
Behavioural Score 
Segments
1-Period 2-Period 3-Period
Observed
 
 
10. Conclusions 
The paper has developed a pilot scheme on how one could use a Markov chain approach 
based on behavioural scores to estimate the credit risk of portfolios of consumer loans. 
This is an attractive approach since behavioural scores are calculated monthly by almost 
all lenders in consumer finance, both for internal decision purposes and for Basel Accord 
requirements. The paper emphasises that behavioural scores are dynamic and since they 
do have a “systemic” factor – the population odds part of the score- the dynamics 
depends on changes in economic conditions. The paper also suggests one needs to 
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consider carefully the appropriate order of the Markov chain. Table 2 shows the impact of 
the previous state as well as the current state on the subsequent transition and strongly 
suggests the need for a second order Markov chain.  
 
Unlike corporate credit risk, one also needs to include the age of the loan into the 
modelling as this affects the credit risk. The out of sample comparison of second order 
models with and without economic factors and age in the model are inconclusive about 
which model is better but this is a time when the economic conditions were very stable. 
In more volatile conditions or if one wants to use the model for stress testing then it will 
be essential to include the economic effects into the modelling. 
Such models are relatively easy for banks to develop since they have all the information 
readily available. The model would be useful for a number of purposes – debt 
provisioning estimation, stress testing in the Basel context as well as investigating the 
relationship between Point in Time Behaviour Scores and through the cycle probabilities 
of default by running the model through an economic cycle. The model could also be 
used by ratings agencies to update their risk estimates of the securitized products based 
on consumer loan portfolios. This would require then to obtain regular updates of the 
behavioural scores of the underlying loans rather than the present approach of just 
making one initial rating based on an application or bureau score. This is extra work but 
might avoid the failures of the rating of the mortgage backed securities (MBS) seen in 
2007 and 2008 and would certainly give early warning of the increasing credit risk in 
such securities. 
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There are still issues to be resolved in modelling the credit risk of consumer loan 
portfolios. One important one is to identify what economic variables most affect 
consumer credit risk and hence should be included on such models. One would expect 
some differences with those which have been recognised in corporate credit risk 
modelling, and one may want to use different variables for different types of consumer 
lending. House price movements will be important for mortgages but may be less 
important for credit cards. One also feels that some of the variables in the models should 
reflect the market conditions as well as the economic conditions, because the tightening 
in consumer lending which prevented customers refinancing did exacerbate the problems 
of 2007 and 2008. This paper has described how such information on economic and 
market conditions can be used in conjunction with behavioural scores to estimate 
portfolio level consumer credit risks. It points out that though Markov chain models 
based on behavioural scores have been used by the industry this has not appeared 
previously in the literature and certainly there has been no extension of the model to 
include the maturity of the loan, the economic factors and the need for higher order 
Markov chains.  
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